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Abstract 
 
This article examines the transformation of the role of the European Commission and the 
European Central Bank (ECB) in the context of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), 
from institutions acting within the EU institutional framework, to actors taking on new tasks 
in the realm of international law as part of the structure of the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM). It expounds the legal framework applying to the two institutions in the ESM by 
analysing the currently applicable legislation as well as recent case law of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU) (Ledra and Mallis). It argues that the applicable legal 
framework remains underdeveloped and unclear, especially with regard to the obligations 
incumbent on the ECB in the ESM, which have not yet been examined by the EU courts. 
Exploring the main challenges resulting from the ambiguity of the tasks and obligations 
conferred on the two EU institutions in the ESM, the article argues that all EU law applies in 
principle to the activities of the EU institutions in the ESM. It then shifts the focus to political 
and legal accountability, the emphasis being on direct and indirect actions before the CJEU, 
including the vexed issue of liability of the EU institutions for damages caused by their 
actions in the ESM. The article concludes with a forward-looking assessment in light of the 
Five Presidents’ Report on Completing the EMU, which stipulates that the governance of the 
ESM should be integrated within the framework of EU law. The article questions whether a 
future incorporation of the ESM’s governance in EU law could address any of the challenges 
resulting from the current uncertainty about the role and potential liability of the Commission 
and the ECB for their actions in the ESM, and makes a number of recommendations as to 
how the ESM should be incorporated into EU law. 
 
Keywords: European Stability Mechanism; Economic and Monetary Union; Financial 
Assistance; European Central Bank; Liability  
1. Introduction 
 
The European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which is the permanent mechanism for giving 
financial assistance to Eurozone Member States, has been in existence for more than four 
years. Although it is an intergovernmental organisation established under international law, 
the ESM has ‘borrowed’ the European Commission and the European Central Bank (ECB) 
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from the EU legal order. Both these EU institutions play a central role in the operation of the 
ESM, notably in the negotiations for financial assistance packages. However, their exact 
tasks, duties and obligations remain rather cryptic. What is more, the legitimacy of their 
involvement in the ESM is uncertain despite the green light given by the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU) to the establishment of the ESM in Pringle.
1
 
This contribution examines the transformation of the role of the Commission and the 
ECB in the context of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), from institutions acting 
within the EU institutional framework, to actors taking on new tasks in the realm of 
international law as part of the ESM’s institutional structure. It presents an account of the 
current legal framework applying to the two institutions in the ESM, taking into consideration 
both the applicable legislation (i.e. EU law and the ESM Treaty) and recent case law of the 
CJEU. It argues that the current body of law governing the actions of the two institutions in 
the ESM is neither fully developed, nor clear, despite the recent clarifications by the CJEU in 
the cases of Mallis and Ledra.
2
 The article deals with the main challenges resulting from the 
ambiguity of the tasks and obligations conferred on the two institutions in the ESM and 
explores whether a future incorporation of the ESM’s governance in the EU Treaty, as 
stipulated in the 2015 Five Presidents’ Report,3 could address these challenges. 
The article is divided in three parts. Firstly, it gives an overview of the legal 
framework governing the activities of the two EU institutions in the ESM. It analyses the 
applicable legislation and the lessons learnt from recent CJEU judgments concerning the 
duties of the two EU institutions when acting in the ESM.  It argues that the CJEU in Ledra 
made a much broader point about the applicability of EU law to the actions of the 
Commission and the ECB than simply declaring that the two institutions are bound by the 
Charter when acting outside EU law. A host of questions arise as a result of the CJEU’s 
approach, including whether all EU law should govern the actions of the EU institutions 
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within the framework of the ESM, and what the confines of the duties of the two institutions 
are. The second part of this contribution attempts to tackle these questions and argues that it 
is easier to identify the tasks conferred on the Commission in the context of the ESM than 
those incumbent on the ECB. Moreover, it is argued that, even assuming that the full scope of 
EU law applies in principle to the two EU institutions when acting under the ESM, further 
questions are raised concerning judicial protection and the availability of avenues to 
challenge the actions of the Commission and the ECB. Finally, the article engages in a 
forward-looking assessment of possible changes to the governance of the ESM if and when it 
is incorporated into EU law. More specifically, it assesses the implications of a future 
incorporation of the ESM into the EU legal framework, which was suggested in the Five 
Presidents’ Report. The said Report is light on details as it does not specify the way(s) in 
which the ESM can or should be brought under the full scope of EU law. The third part of 
this contribution examines the intricacies of this future scenario and inquires whether the 
implementation of this proposal would address any of the challenges resulting from the 
current uncertainty about the role and potential liability of the Commission and the ECB for 
their actions in the ESM. 
2. Mapping the legal framework 
 
In its four years of existence, the ESM has provided financial support of EUR 9 billion to 
Cyprus in 2013 in addition to EUR 1 billion made available to the country by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and up to EUR 86 billion to Greece in 2015 as part of 
the third economic adjustment programme for the country.
4
 
Established as an intergovernmental organisation governed by public international 
law, the ESM was given a host of instruments including the ability to grant precautionary 
financial assistance, financial assistance for the re-capitalisation of financial institutions of an 
ESM Member,
5
 and the power to resort to primary market bond purchases as part of an 
overall financial assistance programme strategy.
6
 Most notably, Article 16(1) of the ESM 
Treaty (ESMT) stipulates that the ESM may grant financial assistance ‘in the form of a loan 
to an ESM Member’, while Article 12(1) ESMT, which is the basis for such support, refers to 
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the ‘strict conditionality’ that must be attached to any grant of financial aid.7 
 
2.1.The role of the two institutions according to the ESM Treaty and By-
Laws 
 
The Commission and the ECB do not constitute part of the ESM’s governance structure per 
se, since ESM decisions can only be adopted by the Board of Governors or the Board of 
Directors. The ESMT (Article 5(f)) specifically states that the Board of Governors, which 
consists of the finance ministers of the Eurozone Member States, takes the decision to 
provide stability support, ‘including the economic policy conditionality as stated in the 
memorandum of understanding (…)’, and the terms of this conditionality.8 The Board of 
Directors consists of ‘people of high competence in economic and financial matters’ from 
each Member State, who are appointed by each Governor (Article 6(1)) and have the 
authority to ‘call in authorised unpaid capital’ (Article 9(2)) and take decisions inter alia as 
delegated by the Board of Governors.
9 
From an organisational perspective, members of the 
European Commission and the President of the ECB may observe the meetings of the Board 
of Governors (Article 5(3)) and of the Board of Directors (Article 6(2)). 
Even though –formally speaking– the Commission and the ECB are not part of the 
ESM’s governance structure, their role in the context of financial assistance packages is not 
at all negligible. According to Articles 5(6)(g) and 13(3) ESMT, the Board of Directors gives 
a mandate to the Commission to undertake certain tasks, including an assessment of the 
existence of risk to the financial stability of the euro area, an assessment of the sustainability 
of public debt, an assessment of the financing needs of the troubled ESM Member State, and 
–crucially– the negotiation of the economic policy conditionality attached to a financial 
assistance package. The Commission undertakes these tasks in liaison with the ECB, and 
finally signs the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on behalf of the ESM after approval 
by the Board of Governors (Article 13(3) and (4) ESMT). When the Commission and the 
ECB find that a failure to grant financial assistance would threaten the economic and 
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financial stability of the euro area, they have the task of ‘promptly’ advising the Chairperson 
and the Managing Director accordingly, and requesting the ‘application of the emergency 
voting procedure’ (Article 4(4)).10 An assessment by the Commission and the ECB is also the 
basis on which the Board of Directors may decide whether any additional form of financial 
assistance is needed (Article 14(6)).  
With regard to tasks that belong to the Commission, Article 13(7) ESMT entrusts the 
Commission –in liaison with the ECB and, whenever possible, together with the IMF– with 
monitoring compliance with the conditionality attached to the financial assistance 
programmes. The Commission is responsible for reporting on the payment of the tranches of 
financial assistance to the recipient Member State, and its reports are the basis for decisions 
by the Board of Directors concerning the recapitalisation of financial institutions of ESM 
Member States (Article 15(5)), ESM loans (Article 16(5)), and primary market facilities 
(Article 17(5)). 
In addition to working with the Commission and the IMF for tasks previously 
mentioned, the ECB is responsible for undertaking an analysis in order to recognise the 
existence of ‘exceptional financial market circumstances and risks to financial stability’ 
which could constitute the basis for decisions on interventions on the secondary market 
(Article 18(2)).  
The ESMT does not provide any further details about the respective roles of the 
Commission and the ECB or about the way in which the two institutions are to fulfil their 
tasks. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, there are no other publicly accessible 
documents or guidelines on the positions of the two institutions in previous bailout 
negotiations either. This lack of information as to the specifics of the role of the two 
institutions can be seen in light of the already identified lack of transparency in the ESM.
11  
Article 34 ESMT imposes a broad obligation of confidentiality, prohibiting not only those 
who work or have worked for the ESM, but also anyone who works or has worked in 
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connection with the ESM from disclosing information that is subject to professional secrecy. 
This confidentiality obligation applies even after the duties of the persons concerned have 
ceased. The ESMT does not define the term ‘professional secrecy’ and does not stipulate 
which type of information is subject to it.
12
 It is also impossible to request access to the 
documents of the Board of Governors, the Board of Directors, the Managing Director, and 
‘other staff members’: according to Article 35 ESMT, these actors ‘enjoy inviolability in 
respect of their official papers and documents.’ One could doubt whether the members of the 
Commission and the ECB should be considered ‘staff members’ of the ESM and thus 
whether Article 35 would apply to them. Even so, Article 32(5) ESMT specifies that, in any 
case, ‘[t]he archives of the ESM and all documents belonging to the ESM or held by it, shall 
be inviolable.’ 
Aside from the ESMT, the most detailed provisions relating to the role of the 
Commission and the ECB in the ESM are those included in Article 17 of the ESM By-Laws, 
which specifies the conditions for the communication and disclosure of documents relating to 
ESM in situations other than internal ones. According to this provision, documents drawn up 
by or on behalf of the Commission or the ECB for use by the ESM ‘may be communicated or 
otherwise disclosed only in accordance with the rules governing disclosure of the documents 
of the relevant institution.’ At first sight, Article 17(2) indicates that the Commission and the 
ECB
13
 are bound by the EU rules on access to documents. These could potentially include the 
full scope of transparency obligations normally applying to the EU institutions within the 
scope of EU law, such as Regulation 1049/2001
14
 and the separate Rules of Procedure of the 
ECB.
15
  
Assuming that the above reading of the ESMT is correct, it should also be noted that 
the transparency obligations of the two institutions in the ESM would not only be defined by 
the applicable legal framework, but would also be limited according to it. For instance, under 
Regulation 1049/2001, EU institutions can refuse access to their documents on grounds of 
public interest and the privacy and integrity of the individual.
16
 Moreover, when talking about 
the transparency of the two institutions, one should be cautious not to put the Commission on 
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a par with the ECB. Under EU law, rules governing transparency are largely contextual, 
resulting in diverse transparency obligations across EU institutions, bodies, and agencies.
17
 
Not only that, but the ECB, in particular, differs from the Commission, the European 
Parliament, and the Council, in so far as it is subject to the Treaty obligation to provide 
access to documents only when exercising its ‘administrative tasks’ (Article 15(3) TFEU). 
Although there is no precise definition of what is included in the category of administrative 
tasks, it is generally acknowledged that EU law favours a wider access to documents from 
EU institutions acting in their legislative capacity than in their administrative capacity.
18
 It 
can be said with certainty that the two institutions are not acting in any legislative capacity in 
the ESM, which already points out to a potentially limited scope for transparency. 
However, Article 17(3) of the ESM By-Laws stipulates that certain documents are 
subject to a different framework of openness than the one described above. Essentially, these 
include the most salient documents produced by the Commission and the ECB for use by the 
ESM: their conclusions on the existence of an imminent threat to the economic and financial 
sustainability of the euro area that would trigger an emergency voting procedure (Article 4(4) 
ESMT); their assessment of a Member State’s request for stability support (Article 13(1) 
ESMT); the MoUs (Article 13(3) ESMT); documents related to the monitoring of a Member 
State’s compliance with the MoU conditionality (Article 13(7) ESMT);  and ECB decisions 
on interventions on the secondary market (Article 18(2) ESMT). These documents can be 
disclosed to parties other than the ESM Members, the Commission, the ECB, and the IMF, 
only after authorisation by the ESM Managing Director.
19
  
The ESM Transparency Initiative, which was endorsed by the ESM’s Board of 
Governors on 16 June 2016, is a welcome development in opening up the details of the role 
of the two institutions:
20
  
Specifically, the ESM now discloses on its website all programme-related 
documents such as the pre-meeting annotated agendas of the BoG and BoD, 
key draft and/or final programme documents (“such as draft Memoranda of 
Understanding, draft financial facility agreements, the assessments by the 
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Troika/Quadriga on risks to financial stability, debt sustainability analyses and 
financing needs, ahead of Board of Governors and Board of Directors 
meetings”), summaries of BoG and BoD decisions and approved programme-
related documents.
21
  
There are, however, notable omissions as well as exceptions from disclosure according to the 
ESM By-Laws. In its recent report on the ESM, Transparency International EU (TI EU) 
argues that the ESM should establish a procedure allowing the public to petition the ESM for 
access to documents drawn up by the ESM, as well as create a public register of documents.
22
 
TI EU further recommends that the ESM clarify in its By-Laws what constitutes an 
‘overriding public interest’ as a basis for precluding the disclosure of ESM documents.23 
Moreover, it argues that the ESM should make available to the public, economic models and 
underlying assumptions that it uses, including those used to compute debt sustainability; and 
redacted minutes of the meetings of the Board of Directors and Board of Governors.
24
 
In spite of the (partial) opening up of the operations of the ESM to the public eye, 
there is still some uncertainty surrounding the actual tasks of the Commission and the ECB in 
the ESM. As seen above, the most detailed legal provisions about the obligations of the 
Commission and the ECB in the ESM have to do with what the two institutions cannot 
disclose to the public. The implications of such uncertainty are discussed later in this article. 
For now, we will move on to see how the CJEU has helped delineate the role of the two 
institutions in the ESM, on two different occasions: in the case of Pringle, and in direct 
actions brought by individuals contesting the terms of MoUs signed between the ESM and an 
ESM Member State. 
2.2.The seal of approval by the CJEU 
 
Despite the uncertainty surrounding the actual tasks of the two institutions in the ESM, the 
CJEU found that the use of the two institutions by the ESM was in line with EU law. To 
refresh the memory of the reader, in the case of Pringle the Court dismissed the challenge to 
the conferral of powers upon the EU institutions pursuant to the ESMT.
25
 The Court relied on 
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prior case law
26
 to rule that Member States can entrust tasks to the EU institutions outside the 
framework of the EU as long as such tasks ‘do not alter the essential character of the powers 
conferred on those institutions’ by the TEU and TFEU.27  
The Court concluded that the tasks conferred on the Commission and the ECB did not 
give any powers to the two institutions ‘to make decisions on their own’, and that their 
decisions ‘solely commit[ted] the ESM’.28 The starting point of the Court’s argument was 
that the Commission is obliged under article 17(1) TEU ‘to promote the general interest of 
the Union’ and ‘oversee the application of Union law’. The objective of the ESMT was to 
ensure the financial stability of the euro area as a whole, hence promoting the general interest 
of the Union. Therefore, so the argument goes, the task of the Commission under the ESMT 
to ensure that the financial assistance programmes were consistent with EU law was part of 
the Commission’s role to oversee the application of EU law.29 A similar line of thought was 
applied to the ECB, starting from Article 282(2) TFEU according to which the ECB can act 
in support of the EU’s general economic policies.  
Yet the Court’s judgment in Pringle has not entirely legitimised the use of EU 
institutions under the ESM. Problematic issues remained both with regard to the legitimacy of 
allowing the two institutions to act (i.e. the core of the matter), and the procedural legal 
requirements on the exact powers of the Commission and the ECB when acting in the ESM 
viz. any limitations to their discretion to act, or any obligations to interact with other EU 
institutions in the process (that is, the details).
30
 With regard to the former, academics have 
voiced criticisms over the arguably misplaced parallelism of the use of EU institutions in the 
ESM and their use in the context of international agreements made by the EU: contrary to the 
ESM, the international agreements had their legal basis in the Treaty (Article 218 TFEU), 
meaning that their adoption was in line with the EU decision-making framework.
31
 Moreover, 
it was argued that bestowing a role to two EU institutions outside the scope of EU law 
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without the involvement of the European Parliament and the Council in the decision-making 
process contradicted the principle of EU institutional balance which in principle legitimises 
the decisions taken at the EU level by ensuring the representation of diverse interests.
32
  
Nonetheless, there is a difference between ruling on whether an EU institution can act 
as part of an intergovernmental organisation, and specifying the details of how the said 
institution is to act. With regard to the latter, Pringle adds little to the picture. In this respect, 
it has been argued that the judgment allows such a wide margin of discretion to groups of 
Member States ‘to establish through intergovernmental agreements institutional structures 
which lie outside the Union framework but which still involve Union institutions’, that it can 
be characterised as a type of ‘constitutional mutation.’33 
To an extent, the silence of the CJEU in Pringle could be attributed to the nature of 
the claim at hand. The case originated from a preliminary reference request from the Irish 
Supreme Court. It was contesting the validity of the establishment of the ESM but it was not 
contesting the actions of the Commission and the ECB in a specific situation such as, for 
example, their actions in the negotiations for a particular financial assistance package agreed 
between the ESM and a financially troubled Member State. As such, the Court did not 
discuss further the responsibilities of the two institutions and did not clarify whether the 
Charter applied to them. More recent litigation from the CJEU has shed some light on the 
role of the two EU institutions when acting under the ESM.  
2.3.Unpacking the duties of the EU institutions 
 
The cases of Mallis and Ledra have given the opportunity to the Court to delve further into 
the substance of the institutions’ involvement in the ESM. Put together, the judgments in both 
cases advance our understanding in the field but, as will be seen later on, they do not answer 
all our questions. The details of the cases, as well as their progression from the General Court 
to the ECJ, are well documented elsewhere and thus will not be repeated here.
34
 Suffice it to 
say that the cases concern the 2013 MoU signed between Cyprus and the ESM for the 
provision of financial assistance to the country as well as the ‘haircut’ imposed on bank 
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depositors for the purposes of recapitalising the Cypriot banks.
35
 
To a large extent, the two cases confirm and build on the CJEU judgment in Pringle; 
indeed, references to Pringle are plentiful. Based on the two cases, we can make five 
observations about the role of the two institutions in the ESM.
36
 
First, the Commission and the ECB are acting as different bodies than the Eurogroup 
in the ESM. The Commission and the ECB are neither delegating powers to the Eurogroup, 
nor are they controlling the Eurogroup, despite their participation in Eurogroup meetings 
according to Protocol 14 on the Eurogroup.
37
 This is, perhaps, a self-evident point, yet the 
Court clarified it because the applicants in Mallis had argued that the decision for the haircut 
on deposits, which was included in a statement of the Eurogroup, was actually taken by the 
Commission and the ECB. Yet it is noteworthy that in its ruling the CJEU did not undertake 
an examination of what the Commission and the ECB do when they sit in Eurogroup 
meetings. This brings to the spotlight once more the overall lack of transparency in the whole 
structure of the ESM briefly discussed above and further analysed in the subsequent section. 
Secondly, the Court repeated that, when the two institutions act under the ESM, they 
do not have the power to take decisions of their own and their activities are only binding on 
the ESM, in this way confirming its previous judgment in Pringle.
38
 A question arising, 
however, concerns who is responsible for checking whether the Commission and the ECB 
comply with the limits of their powers. It is one thing to say that, by law, an institution cannot 
act in a certain field, for a certain objective, in a certain way, or to a certain extent. Indeed, 
EU primary and secondary law is filled with examples of limitations to the powers of EU 
institutions to act, in a similar vein as the law prescribes the delimitation of EU competences. 
It is another thing altogether to scrutinise whether these institutions comply with the limits to 
their powers or not. Judicial review exists to fulfill this purpose. Otherwise it would have 
sufficed to say that because the law prescribes that institutions should act in a certain way, 
they certainly do so. Instead of imposing a strong level of judicial scrutiny on the two 
institutions, the ECJ in Mallis limited itself into reiterating the tasks of the two institutions as 
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 Ibid paras 46-50; ECJ judgment in Joined Cases C-105/15 P to C-109/15 P Mallis, paras 52-3. 
12 
 
expressed in the text of the ESMT.
39
 On this basis, it concluded that the Eurogroup statement 
was not the expression of the two institutions’ decision-making powers. 
Thirdly, the participation of the Commission and the ECB in the negotiation of the 
financial assistance packages and in signing a respective MoU, does not enable that MoU to 
be classified as an act that can be imputed to the two institutions.
40
 Since the ESMT is an 
international agreement signed outside the EU legal framework, the relevant MoUs are ‘acts 
extraneous to the EU legal order’41 and therefore their legality cannot be challenged under 
Article 263 TFEU.
42
  
The two final observations are definitely the most interesting. According to the Court, 
the fact that the ESM is outside the EU legal order does not prevent the Luxembourg Courts 
from examining a claim for damages under Article 340 TFEU against the two institutions for 
allegedly unlawful conduct during the adoption of a financial assistance programme.
43
 This 
ruling contrasts with the long-held position of the CJEU that a claim for judicial review of 
that same conduct is inadmissible under Article 263 TFEU.
44
 
The case of Ledra constitutes a milestone in that it is the first occasion in which the 
ECJ reviewed the conduct of an EU institution –namely the Commission– under the ESM. 
Linked to this point, the ECJ also clarified for the first time that the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights was applicable to the EU institutions when acting outside the EU legal 
framework. The applicants in Ledra had essentially argued that the haircut on deposits was in 
breach of the right to property, contrary to Article 17(1) of the Charter and Article 1 of 
Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). On this account, they 
argued that the Commission had failed to fulfil its duty to ensure that the financial assistance 
programme was consistent with EU law.  
After Ledra, we can speak in more certain terms about the duty of the Commission to 
ensure consistency between the MoUs signed by the ESM and EU law; a duty that derives 
from Pringle and Article 13(3) and (4) ESMT. According to the ECJ, the Commission 
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 Ibid paras 54-9. 
40
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‘retains, within the framework of the ESM Treaty, its role of guardian of the Treaties as 
resulting from Article 17(1) TFEU.’45 As a consequence, the Commission ‘should refrain 
from signing a memorandum of understanding whose consistency with EU law it doubts.’46 
There are no further distinctions by the ECJ as to the character of this duty that would limit 
the obligations of the Commission: for example, there is no contrast in the case law between 
a positive and negative duty of the Commission which might have distinguished between a 
prohibition on the Commission to deliberately breach EU rules (negative duty) and an 
obligation incumbent on the Commission ‘to avert any possible conflict or tension between 
the provisions of an act adopted by other entities and any EU rule which may be applicable to 
the situation.’47 Instead, the ECJ in Ledra created a bridge between the interpretation of the 
institutions’ powers in Pringle and the duties of the Commission under both EU law and the 
ESMT. Perhaps due to the fact that the applicants did not focus on the obligations of the 
ECB, the Court did not delve into the role of the ECB in the ESM. 
3. The missing parts: An analytical framework for the role of the Commission 
and ECB in the ESM 
 
The discussion has thus far focused on the key lessons drawn from Mallis and Ledra on the 
role of the Commission and the ECB in the ESM. We have thus far discussed ‘what we 
know’ about the Commission and ECB, our main sources of knowledge being the CJEU’s 
jurisprudence and the ESMT and By-Laws. The focus now shifts to the missing parts of the 
story or, indeed, ‘what we do not know’ about the role of the Commission and the ECB 
within the framework of the ESM. 
3.1. Who does what? 
 
It is axiomatic that any discussion on accountability begins with mapping the tasks conferred 
on the institution concerned, whose performance in carrying them out is then appraised by the 
accountability holder against a set of predefined standards. It is impossible to hold one to a 
set of standards, to judge whether one has met her responsibilities in light of these standards, 
and to impose sanctions (if that is an option) when the accountability holder does not even 
know what the institution has been precisely up to in a given context. 
                                                          
45
 ECJ judgment in Joined Cases C-8/15 P to C-10/15 P Ledra, para 59. 
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There is little clarity about the respective roles of the Commission and the ECB within 
the framework of the ESM, over and above the ESMT provisions that were explicated above. 
We do not know what their precise tasks are, nor is their framework of cooperation crystal 
clear. What is more, we have very little information about their role and respective positions 
in the bailout negotiations, which makes it very difficult to assign responsibility to them for 
their actions in the ESM. This is all the more so with respect to the ECB’s actions in the 
context of the ESM because the case law has not thus far dealt with the role of the ECB in the 
ESM.
48
  
It is understandable that one should be cautious to preserve a ‘space to think’ between 
and within these institutions, as the sensitivity of the bailout negotiations and their utmost 
significance for financial stability in the euro area and the Member State concerned so 
demand. Even EU primary law recognises that the extent of transparency obligations of an 
institution is sometimes dependent on the nature of the tasks undertaken by the said 
institution.
49
 However, this is not a normative reason for blurring the lines of responsibility or 
failing to provide at least some information on one’s activities even ex post facto. For 
example, there is no mention of the ECB’s activities in the ESM in the ECB’s annual report 
for 2016.
50
 The report only mentions Mallis and Ledra under the heading ‘ECB participation 
in judicial proceedings at the EU level’,51 as well as the Greek Emergency Liquidity 
Assistance case.
52 It is not readily explicable why the ECB’s annual report makes no mention 
to the (perhaps limited) activities of the ECB in the ESM.
53
 
3.2. Which rules apply? 
 
We now turn to consider the rules that govern the activities of the Commission and the ECB 
in the ESM – a point of contention before the judgment in Ledra, especially as regards the 
scope of application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
54
 Some doubts, however, do 
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remain as to whether all EU law should apply to the activities of the EU institutions in the 
ESM. We argue that all EU law should in principle apply to the activities of the Commission 
and the ECB in the ESM (section 3.2.1). Though the principle ought to be, in our opinion, 
very clear, the precise obligations incumbent on the Commission and –even more so– on the 
ECB evade neat classification (section 3.2.2). 
3.2.1. All EU law applies, in principle, to the activities of the EU 
institutions in the ESM 
 
As regards the obligations incumbent on the EU institutions in the context of the ESM, in 
Ledra the challenge was indeed based on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and more 
specifically on the right to property (Article 17(1) of the Charter). However, the Court is 
making a much broader point about the applicability of EU law to the actions of the 
Commission and the ECB in the context of the ESM.
55
 Should all EU law govern the actions 
of the EU institutions within the framework of the ESM? In other words, are the Commission 
and the ECB bound by the full scope of EU law when acting within the formal confines of the 
ESM Treaty? 
 First of all, it is clear from the Court’s reasoning in Ledra that the EU institutions are 
not just bound by the Charter when acting in the ESM. The Commission’s obligation to 
ensure that the MoUs concluded between the ESM and recipient Member States are 
consistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter was said by the Court to 
derive from Article 17(1) TEU and Article 13(3)-(4) ESMT.
56
 Leaving the ESMT provision 
aside for the moment, it is clear that the Court’s reasoning is premised on the assumption that 
Article 17(1) TEU binds the European Commission also when acting outside the formal 
confines of the EU Treaties.
57
  
 In light of the above, a new conclusion arises with regard to the role of the 
Commission and the ECB. We argue that all primary and secondary EU law should in 
principle govern the activities of the Commission and the ECB in the ESM. We believe this 
point was made rather clear in Ledra. Furthermore, we see no doctrinal or normative reason 
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why specifically the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights should apply to the activities of the 
EU institutions involved in the ESM, to the exclusion of other primary or indeed secondary 
EU law. In this regard, we have already seen an example from EU secondary law governing 
the activities of the EU institutions in this context. EU rules on access to documents may 
indeed be drawn upon to obtain key information from the EU institutions, as explained above 
(section 2.1). The Eurogroup President seems to be in agreement with this proposition, as 
shown from his exchange of letters with the European Ombudsman on transparency in the 
workings of the Eurogroup and the Eurogroup Working Group.
58
 This reinforces the 
argument regarding the application of EU law to the institutions. 
It is noted, however, that there might be cases where the relevant EU provisions do 
not ‘fit’ into this context, given their wording, scope, structure and objectives, and therefore it 
cannot altogether be excluded that some EU provisions might not be applicable in concreto. 
Having said that, it is difficult to determine in the abstract which these provisions might be, 
as this would require an ad hoc examination in the light of the particular circumstances of 
each case.  
3.2.2. The obligations incumbent on the ECB in the ESM 
 
We have seen above that the ECJ focused in Ledra on the legal obligations incumbent on the 
Commission when signing the MoU on behalf of the ESM. There is much less by way of 
legal material (case law or academic literature) on the obligations incumbent on the ECB in 
the ESM. In fact, there is an interesting symmetry between the tasks and duties conferred on 
the ECB in the ESM. There is little clarity on the ECB’s role in the ESM; and equally little 
clarity on the ECB’s duties when acting in the ESM. 
Arguably, it was easier because of the Court’s reasoning in the earlier case of Pringle 
to make the argument in Ledra that the Commission ought to ensure that the MoU is 
                                                          
58
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compatible with the Charter.
59
 In Pringle, the Court noted that ‘it [was] stated in Article 17(1) 
TEU that the Commission “shall promote the general interest of the Union” and “shall 
oversee the application of Union law”’.60 The Court further added that ‘the tasks allocated to 
the Commission by the ESM Treaty enable[d] it, as provided in Article 13(3) and (4) of that 
Treaty, to ensure that the memoranda of understanding concluded by the ESM are consistent 
with European Union law’.61 Pringle was, however, very light on detail with respect to the 
role of the ECB in the ESM.
62
 The only obiter dictum that is pertinent for present purposes 
was that ‘[b]y virtue of its duties within the ESM Treaty, the ECB supports the general 
economic policies in the Union, in accordance with Article 282(2) TFEU’.63 It is only then 
logical and coherent with the structure and objectives of the EU Treaties to infer that the ECB 
may not endanger price stability when acting in the ESM, as this is its primary objective and 
it may only support the general economic policies in the Union ‘[w]ithout prejudice to that 
objective’.64 Hence we can safely argue that the ECB has a duty to avoid endangering price 
stability when acting under the ESM, in line with its EU Treaties mandate (Article 127 
TFEU). 
Nevertheless, the ECB’s Treaty obligations when acting in the ESM do not stop there. 
It is further provided in Article 127(1) TFEU that ‘[t]he ESCB [which is governed by the 
decision-making bodies of the ECB] shall act in accordance with the principle of an open 
market economy with free competition, favouring an efficient allocation of resources, and in 
compliance with the principles set out in Article 119’. These include ‘stable prices, sound 
public finances and monetary conditions and a sustainable balance of payments’.65 
Consequently, the ECB should in principle object to a bailout programme whose fiscal 
targets, for example, are either not rigid enough or unattainable. Moreover, the very robust 
Treaty provisions on the ECB’s independence are also applicable in the ESM context and 
should therefore be respected by the EU and national institutions involved in the bailout 
negotiations.
66 The ECB cannot be ‘forced’ for example to use its monetary policy tools in a 
certain manner as part of a bailout agreement. 
 Unfortunately, the latest case law on the ECB does not advance the debate any 
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further. The Nausicaa case concerns the Greek debt cut, and legal argument revolves around 
general principles of EU law.
67
 The Court has not yet had the opportunity to elaborate further 
on the obligations incumbent on the Commission and – even more so – on the ECB in the 
context of the ESM. Be that as it may, this has important consequences for holding these two 
institutions accountable for their activities in the ESM, as explained in the next section. 
3.3. Who can ultimately be held responsible and how? 
 
The discussion thus far has focused on the rules applicable to the activities of the 
Commission and the ECB in the ESM. How are these rules enforced and who monitors the 
activities of the EU institutions in the ESM? There is an elephant in the room, as 
accountability can be very difficult to secure in this context. The key message from the 
relevant literature is that the intergovernmentalist, non-EU legal nature of the ESM 
compounds the difficulties in terms of holding the EU institutions and ESM bodies 
accountable to political and legal fora.
68
 
 As regards the role of parliaments, the ESMT does not even mention the European 
Parliament. In practice, the ESM’s Managing Director, Klaus Regling, participates in 
hearings in the European Parliament whenever he is asked to do so.
69
 As regards national 
parliaments, the ESMT merely requires that the annual report from the ESM’s Board of 
Auditors be transmitted to them.
70
 Nevertheless, the parliaments of the Eurozone Member 
States have a role in holding their finance ministers and other officials separately to account 
for their actions in the ESM. It is in this sense that accountability is ‘decentralised’: the Board 
of Governors or Directors is not accountable to the European (or a national) Parliament as a 
body, and therefore national parliaments may only hold their own government officials 
accountable for their actions in the ESM, in accordance with the national constitutional 
requirements.
71
 
 Though the ESMT grants the power to the CJEU to adjudicate on disputes between an 
ESM member and the ESM, or between ESM members, on the interpretation and application 
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of the ESMT and By-Laws,
72
 it is only fair to argue that in all likelihood there will not be 
many such disputes submitted to the CJEU, if any at all, due to the political sensitivities 
involved. Moreover, natural and legal persons do not have standing to bring a case before the 
CJEU challenging the legality of ESM acts as the ESMT now stands. This point should be 
kept in mind pending the ESMT’s incorporation in the EU Treaties, which will be discussed 
in section 4. 
As regards judicial protection in the peculiar context of EMU, there are a number of 
issues which have not yet been clarified in the relevant case law. We have already seen in the 
lessons drawn from Mallis and Ledra that the MoU and the acts of the ESM bodies are non-
EU legal measures and therefore cannot be directly challenged before the CJEU. Statements 
by the Eurogroup are not subject to review by the CJEU either, as the Eurogroup does not 
formally have legally binding powers. We assume by the same token that Euro Summit 
statements could not be challenged before the CJEU either. 
What is then left in terms of direct or indirect actions for crisis-hit litigants from ESM 
countries wishing to put their substantive case before the CJEU? An Article 263 TFEU action 
for annulment would almost never be available to non-privileged applicants (natural or legal 
persons). Even if the latter could locate a formally binding EU law measure adopted by –most 
likely– the Council pursuant to the Excessive Deficit Procedure73 or ‘two-pack’ legislation,74 
they would almost always be unable to meet the requirements of direct and individual 
concern.
75
 This is evidenced in the Greek ADEDY cases.
76
  
Alternatively, private persons might be able to use the Article 267 TFEU preliminary 
reference route. However, they would again be faced with substantial difficulties, which are 
not specific to the EMU context. First, ‘the applicant has no right to decide whether a 
reference is made, which measures are referred for review or what grounds of invalidity are 
raised and thus no right of access to the Court of Justice’.77 Secondly, there might be no 
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challengeable implementing measures or –more plausibly– the applicant might have to break 
the law in order to be able to challenge ensuing sanctions.
78
 Thirdly, it is well known that 
‘indirect challenges (…) present a number of procedural disadvantages in comparison to 
direct challenges (…) as regards for example the participation of the institution(s) which 
adopted the measure, the delays and costs involved, the award of interim measures or the 
possibility of third party intervention’.79 Litigants would most likely have to fight their way 
through more than one national court, as only courts or tribunals against whose decisions 
there is no judicial remedy under national law are obliged to make a reference to the CJEU 
for a preliminary ruling.
80
 
Some difficulties linked to making an Article 267 TFEU challenge against the actions 
of the EU institutions are, however, specific to the peculiar context of EMU. It should not 
escape our attention that the challenges thus far made to bailout terms through the Article 267 
TFEU route have all been declared inadmissible. This is evidenced by the Romanian
81
 and 
Portuguese MoU cases,
82
 which at the very least attest to the difficulties involved in 
establishing a link between the contested bailout terms and EU law measures. 
The only viable option available to non-privileged applicants would then be an Article 
340 TFEU action for damages, with all its difficulties and uncertainties which are yet to be 
clarified in the relevant case law. For one, the requirement of a sufficiently serious breach of 
a rule of EU law intended to confer rights on individuals would almost never be met by 
litigants in this context, as the EU institutions concerned undertake complex economic 
assessments and are, generally speaking, granted a wide margin of appreciation. We have 
seen in Ledra that the Court of Justice ruled that there was no disproportionate interference 
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with the right to property. It could be argued that the Cypriot cases were ‘difficult cases’, as 
the application of the ‘bail-in’ tool to the Cypriot banks was deemed to be absolutely 
necessary in order to safeguard financial stability. Moreover, there is always an argument to 
be made in ‘bail-in’ cases that the depositors do not incur greater losses than they would have 
incurred had the banks collapsed (‘no creditor worse off’ principle).83 
However, as shown in the latest case law, claims for damages resulting from pension 
cuts –a relatively ‘easier’ case, given the existence of ECtHR case law84 that the CJEU could 
have drawn upon–85 were equally unsuccessful. In the Sotiropoulou case, the impugned cuts 
were mandated by a Council decision which was adopted on the basis of Articles 126(9) and 
136 TFEU.
86
 The General Court found no violation of Articles 1 (dignity), 25 (the rights of 
the elderly) and 34 (social security and social assistance) of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. The Council had not manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits of its discretion, 
the emphasis being, unsurprisingly, on its wide margin of appreciation.
87
 What is more, the 
Sotiropoulou case goes to show that litigants might sometimes not even be able to locate a 
rule of law intended to confer rights on them for the purposes of establishing the non-
contractual liability of the EU institutions for damages caused to them. In the case of 
Sotiropoulou, the General Court held that the rules on EU competence (Articles 4 and 5 
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TFEU) were not intended to confer rights on the applicants.
88
 Had an Article 263 TFEU 
challenge been available, these grounds could have been invoked to annul –if found valid– 
the measure. 
Establishing a causal link between the conduct of the EU institution concerned and 
the damage caused to the individual might also prove tricky for litigants in this area. This is 
all the more so in the case of ‘prior actions’, that is measures that were adopted by the 
national authorities prior to the conclusion of the MoU. In the case of Cyprus, it will be 
recalled that the General Court ruled in Ledra that the applicant had not established with the 
necessary certainty that the damage it claimed to have suffered from the ‘bail-in’ of its 
deposits was actually caused by the inaction alleged against the Commission.
89
 This point 
was not addressed by the ECJ on appeal, as the claim failed on the first requirement for non-
contractual liability (that is, showing a sufficiently serious breach of EU law). As such, we do 
not know if ‘prior actions’ are indeed shielded from review by the EU courts in this sense, or 
whether perhaps the ECJ might hold a different opinion on the issue. It would seem that the 
ECJ is implicitly disagreeing with the General Court on this point, but the point was not per 
se addressed by the Court.
90
 
Furthermore, it is not clear what it would take for the ECB to be held liable for 
damages caused to private persons through its actions within the framework of the ESM.
91
 It 
is difficult to think of a rule of law intended to conferred rights on individuals that could be 
breached by the ECB in a sufficiently serious manner when carrying out its tasks in the ESM. 
This is all the more so since it is only the Commission that is signing the MoU on behalf of 
the ESM. The complex analyses undertaken by the ECB in the context of the ESM are not of 
the type that could easily give rise to a claim for damages for breach of EU law.
92
 
4. Forward-looking assessment: Incorporating the ESM governance framework 
into the EU legal framework 
 
Looking forward, the ESM could perhaps be incorporated into EU law, as was suggested in 
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the Five Presidents’ Report in order to enhance accountability in the area of EMU.93 Until 
then, the ESM will remain partly outside the scope of application of Treaty provisions and 
EU secondary law, as well as the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
94
 This is because the 
acts adopted by ESM bodies are non-EU law measures. What is more, the role of parliaments, 
courts and various EU bodies and agencies will remain limited, as explained above.
95
 
The Five Presidents’ Report is, however, vague as to how the ESM’s governance 
framework should be integrated within the EU Treaties. Should the ESM become an EU 
institution within the meaning of Article 13 TEU? Should it perhaps take the form of an EU 
agency or body? What should its institutional, accountability and transparency arrangements 
look like? Should perhaps the influence of larger Member States be mitigated? And how 
would the ESM interrelate with the existing EU bodies (informal or otherwise) such as the 
Eurogroup and the Eurogroup Working Group whose membership is identical to the ESM 
bodies? 
We believe that the ESM should become an EU institution (rather than an agency) so 
as to avoid the complex, byzantine governance structures that pertain to the area of Banking 
Union. We are mostly speaking of the Single Resolution Mechanism, as it is the Single 
Resolution Board that took the form of an EU agency and its decision-making processes are, 
by reason of EU constitutional constraints, incredibly complex.
96
 One benefit of 
incorporating the ESM within the EU legal order would be that the transparency and 
accountability of the ESM’s operations should be enhanced. Its integration into the fabric of 
EU law would already go a long way to addressing the concerns identified in this paper, as 
the ESM would be able to benefit from the services of and synergies with the EU institutions, 
bodies, offices and agencies (the European Parliament, Ombudsman, Fundamental Rights 
Agency, Court of Auditors, Data Protection Supervisor, and the European Anti-Fraud Office 
(OLAF)).
97
 This is predicated on the assumption that the powers of the EU institutions, 
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bodies and agencies would not be restricted in the case of ESM. Similarly, if the aim is to 
make a real change in the EMU accountability arrangements, the powers of the CJEU should 
not be restricted in this area in an AFSJ fashion. All the acts of the ESM should in principle 
be subject to full review by the CJEU upon the ESM’s incorporation into the EU Treaties. 
In any event, the implementation of this proposal would not solve all problems 
identified with respect to judicial review in this area of law. The rules on standing for Article 
263 TFEU challenges would remain restricted for non-privileged applicants. The procedural 
difficulties identified above with respect to Article 267 TFEU challenges would continue to 
exist. Meeting the requirements for non-contractual liability of the EU institutions would 
remain a tall order. The above-mentioned limitations on transparency and access to 
documents would probably still bite, by way of explicit exceptions built into the relevant EU 
instruments, thereby further compounding the difficulties for litigants wishing to bring a case 
before the EU courts. Furthermore, we do acknowledge that the EU courts would most likely 
be deferential to the ESM bodies in future cases brought before them. 
5. Conclusion 
 
This article has considered the role of the Commission and the ECB in the ESM. It examined 
the legislative framework applying to the ESM, including soft law issued by the ESM itself 
(e.g. the ESM By-Laws) and recent litigation challenging the actions of the two institutions in 
the Mechanism. Taking stock of the lessons learned from recent case law, the article has put 
forward an analytical framework that aims to identify the law applicable to the two 
institutions when acting in the ESM, including their respective obligations. Certain features 
of this contribution are particularly pertinent in the context of the debate on this topic which, 
surprisingly, has remained rather unexplored after the initial stages of the ESM’s life. 
In particular, the analysis in this contribution has indicated that the legal framework 
pertaining to the activities of the EU institutions in the ESM is unclear. We have seen that the 
CJEU has given the green light to the participation of the Commission and the ECB in the 
ESM in Pringle and has further elaborated in Ledra on the responsibilities of the Commission 
when acting in the ESM. Yet the lack of precise information about the institutions’ activities 
or respective positions in the meetings and the negotiations taking place within the ESM do 
not allow us to develop a complete understanding of the specifics of their role. This is all the 
more so with respect to the involvement of the ECB in the negotiations for financial 
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assistance packages, a matter which remains entirely untouched by the CJEU to date. The 
ESM Transparency Initiative is a welcome development in the quest to unravel the 
involvement of the two institutions in the ESM. 
Beyond the issues with transparency, the article has sought to identify which law 
applies to the activities of the EU institutions in the ESM. In this respect, we have argued that 
it is not just the EU Charter that should govern the activities of the Commission (and the 
ECB) in the ESM. Instead, the whole body of EU law (including primary and secondary EU 
law) should in principle govern the activities of the two institutions, unless one can point to a 
reason specific to a certain EU law act or Treaty provision that would render them 
inapplicable to the activities of the EU institutions in the ESM. Admittedly, although the 
discussion in this article has identified some of the concrete duties of the EU institutions 
when acting in the ESM, it is difficult to specify in the abstract the entire range of the 
institutions’ duties. Nevertheless, the principle that the entire body of EU law applies to the 
situation at hand ought to be very clear. It is firmly based on the Court’s reasoning in Ledra, 
and reinforced by other documents, such as the ESM By-Laws, which stipulate that EU 
institutions are bound by EU law on disclosure of their documents even when acting for the 
benefit of the ESM. 
Finally, it was seen that, despite the application of the full scope of EU law, it can be 
difficult to hold the EU institutions and ESM bodies politically and legally accountable for 
their activities in the ESM. In this connection, it was argued that the incorporation of the 
ESM into the EU law framework would go a long way in addressing the difficulties involved 
in holding the ESM bodies and EU institutions accountable for their actions. It would 
especially enhance transparency and give rise to synergies with various EU institutions, 
bodies and agencies, such as the European Parliament, the Court of Auditors, and the 
European Ombudsman.  
The identified potential for enhancing the accountability of the ESM would depend, 
however, on the precise legal and institutional arrangements pertaining to the ESM upon its 
incorporation into the EU law framework. To maximise the benefits in terms of 
accountability and transparency and minimise the complexity of the ensuing institutional 
arrangements, the ESM should take the form of an EU institution within the meaning of 
Article 13 TEU. This option would –in principle– bring the acts and omissions of the ESM 
under the full review of the CJEU. Whether the CJEU will defer to the assessment made by 
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the ESM in a given case is another matter. Meanwhile, we will have to wait and see what will 
happen when the integration of the ESM within the EU legal framework becomes a priority 
as part of the plan to ‘complete the EMU Architecture’.98 
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